How Charleston got her groove back: A Convention and Visitors Bureau's response to 9/11

Article in Journal Of Vacation Marketing · April 2003
DOI: 10.1177/135676670300900207

2 authors, including:

Stephen Litvin
College of Charleston
85 PUBLICATIONS 2,267 CITATIONS

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

The impact of contextual cues on response rate, conversion rate, and destination preference in travel surveys View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Stephen Litvin on 11 September 2015.
The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.
HOW CHARLESTON GOT HER GROOVE BACK:
A CVB’S RESPONSE TO 9/11

Stephen W. Litvin
College of Charleston

Laurie Lynn Alderson
Charleston Area Convention and Visitors Bureau

Contact:

Stephen W. Litvin
School of Business & Economics
College of Charleston
66 George Street
Charleston, S.C. 29424-0001

Telephone: 843-953-7317
Fax: 843-953-5697
e-mail: litvins@cofc.edu

Stephen W. Litvin is Associate Professor of Hospitality and Tourism Management at the College of Charleston (South Carolina). He previously taught at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Before entering academia, Steve was a CPA and consultant for two Big Five CPA firms. He has fifteen years of travel industry experience.

Laurie Lynn Alderson is Director, Administration and Finance, for the Charleston (South Carolina) Area Convention and Visitors Bureau. She received her BS from the College of Charleston and earned her MBA from The Citadel. Laurie Lynn has seven years of travel industry experience.

Cite as:


Following is the final submitted draft of the article. Please see Journal of Vacation Marketing for published article.
HOW CHARLESTON GOT HER GROOVE BACK:
A CVB’S RESPONSE TO 9/11

ABSTRACT

The events of September 11, 2001 had immediate impact on the tourism industry of the world. For domestic USA tourism, overall demand fell by 15% overnight, with hotel rates simultaneously softening by 10%. The industry faced an uncertain future. This paper looks at post-9/11 tourism in Charleston, SC. The city, which suffered an immediate decline following 9/11 steeper than the national average, has since enjoyed a remarkably robust recovery. In reviewing this recovery, the crisis management actions of the Charleston (SC) Area Convention and Visitors Bureau are discussed and analysed.

KEY WORDS

Crisis management, 9/11, destination marketing, geographic market segmentation
 HOW CHARLESTON GOT HER GROOVE BACK:
A CVB’S RESPONSE TO 9/11

INTRODUCTION

The impacts of the events of September 11, 2001 affected virtually all tourism providers. Marketing plans, so carefully laid out over the spring and summer, were found instantly useless as industry officials recognised, within moments following the calamity, that new, unexpected, and uncharted challenges required immediate address. The purpose of this paper is to review as a case study the highly successful post-crisis efforts of the Charleston (SC) Area Convention & Visitors Bureau (CACVB), providing valuable insight for CVBs facing future crises.

Charleston, South Carolina, as a tourism destination, offers visitors a wide array of attractions. An attractive port city, with the largest preserved historic district in the USA, nearby beaches, a temperate climate, and Civil War era plantations, forts and gardens, the Charleston area attracts in excess of 4 million annual visitors. The beauty and charm of the area has earned the Holy City numerous accolades, including recent awards from Conde Nast Traveler, whose readers for the ninth consecutive year rated Charleston a “Top 10 Travel Destination in North America”; National Geographic Traveler, which included the city among its listing of “The Top 50 Places of a Lifetime: America”; and
Southern Living, whose readers’ poll rated Charleston as both a “Favorite Dream Getaway” and “Favorite Historic Destination.”

Since the city’s recovery from Hurricane Hugo in 1989, an event which decimated much of the city and with it the hospitality and tourism industry, the Charleston area has enjoyed continuous year-to-year visitor growth (recent numbers, annual visitors, in millions: 1997 = 3.2; 1998 = 3.3; 1999 = 3.7; 2000 = 3.9). On September 10, 2001, as the CACVB looked ahead to October, traditionally the second busiest month of the year, there was no reason for anything but optimism.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT: A PRIMER

The Pacific Asia Travel Association (PATA) has described a tourism crisis as “a disaster, whether natural or man-made, that has the potential to totally disrupt the tourism industry.” Calamities such as natural disasters, social unrest, political uncertainty, transport accidents, and acts of terrorism represent problems of crisis proportion that destinations must face. Clearly, recognition that such potentially negative events can strike mandates an investment in pre-crisis response planning. PATA however noted that most of its members, including national tourist organisations, did not include crisis management in their strategic planning, despite their own estimation that they stood a 40% chance of a crisis occurring. A study by González-Herrero and Pratt found a similar lack of planning. Their survey of tourism organisations in the USA and Spain found that while 78% of American organisations had at least an informal crisis
management plan in place, only 29% of Spanish organisations had made such investment. This should be of concern, for, as one often hears espoused, ‘if you fail to plan, you plan to fail’. The intensity of the moment during crisis is clearly not the time to commence such planning.

The general consensus of those authors who have studied crisis management is that successful response requires, at a minimum before crisis looms, three elements to be in place. These are, 1) a formal and well thought out tourism crisis management plan, 2) the appointment of a standing tourism crisis management task force, and 3) designation of a crisis management centre, either formal or informal, but always equipped with appropriate data access and communications facilities. With these tools ready, during the ‘heat of the battle’ much critical guesswork is avoided.

TOURISM AND TERROISM

Sönmez, Apostolopoulos, and Tarlow noted that while natural disasters impede tourism flow, it is risk of terrorism that most severely impacts tourism. When travel ceases to be pleasurable, as a function of either real or perceived terrorism risk, it is the logical response of tourists to ‘vote with their feet’, either choosing not to travel, or to select travel means and destinations that avoid risky situations. While the authors suggested that “every tourist destination should incorporate crisis management planning into its overall tourism planning, marketing, and management strategies” they stressed that “those destinations vulnerable to politically motivated violence in particular need a plan
of action to follow.” Since they wrote this, a sad yet salient lesson of the events of 9/11 is that no city can any longer afford itself the luxury of believing that it is not a target of political violence. While cities may justifiably consider the potential for direct attack as minimal, 9/11 has taught us, in our increasingly interconnected world, that all cities have become at least indirect targets. When transportation systems cease to function, when fear is endemic, when people simply decide the only place they wish to be is at home with their families, no destination is immune to terrorism. (Readers wishing to further explore the impacts of terrorism, political turmoil and war upon tourism are referred to Sönmez’ comprehensive review of the literature focusing upon the relationship between these phenomena.)

Aaker advised that the best way to handle a disaster is to avoid it. He offered as his second best defence, that the organisation “detect the problem early and do something about it before it blows up”. Coombs refers to this as “signal detection.” Clearly, for 9/11, on a community level, neither prevention nor detection were options. The terrorist events happened in distant cities and a tourism crisis befell all. Thus, failing prevention, CVBs and NTOs worldwide engaged the established steps of crisis management. Crisis management plans were dusted off as crisis management teams assembled in crisis management centres to consider impact and begin the synthesis of strategies and tactics required to ensure their local tourism industry’s business continuity.

This paper looks at the specific actions of the CACVB, analyses results, and provides reflection on some of the lessons learned.
CACVB’S REACTION TO THE CRISIS

The CACVB had a crisis plan prepared and crisis management team members designated, each of whom knew where to meet. The first meeting of the team convened the afternoon of 9/11, well before the shock of the morning’s events were understood. What was soon evident to the team was that their crisis management plan would prove to be of limited value. What to do in a hurricane or a flood? The plan provided, post-Hugo, well documented procedures. With which government agencies to co-ordinate when faced with an outbreak of local violence? Again, the crisis management plan offered detailed direction. The common thread throughout the crisis management plan - all envisioned scenarios were those predicated on local problems. But, how could drafters of the plan have ever foreseen an event of the scope experienced that day? What clairvoyant could have envisioned that incidents 500+ miles distant would have such a devastating effect on the local tourism industry? Given the holes in the plan they had to work with, the team spent the balance of that day and many to follow crafting what was in effect a new plan.

As with most communities, the team recognised their immediate need was the taking care of passengers trapped in the city due to the closure of the air traffic system. The CACVB took the lead in this effort, sending staffers to the airport to work with stranded passengers, both visitors heading home and the several thousand air travellers deposited in Charleston from the twelve jets diverted to the local airport. These passengers were found accommodations and assisted in obtaining alternative ground transportation. Once
this job was accomplished the airport became eerily quiet. For the next week, no passengers arrived and none departed.

Even as the above discussed assistance effort was taking place, assessment of impact and strategies for overcoming the inevitable visitor arrival shortfall were addressed, with one fact immediately clear; with the indefinite airline system shutdown no visitors would soon be arriving in Charleston by air. With very limited rail transportation to Charleston and interstate bus travel less relevant still, what remained was the drive market.

Fortunately for Charleston, the destination is traditionally a drive-to destination, with approximately 85% of annual visitors arriving by automobile. The map in Figure 1 illustrates, through the use of concentric circles, the driving distance to Charleston from its key markets. Charleston focuses its drive-in marketing efforts towards those cities within a six hour radius. This includes all of South Carolina, most of North Carolina, northern Florida, and parts of Georgia, to include Atlanta. Clearly, this six-hour radius does not encompass all visitors who arrive in the city by automobile. For example, many north-south interstate travellers on I-95, heading say from New York to Miami, detour the 50 miles to Charleston for a short stay, and numerous vacationers in Myrtle Beach, 100 miles to the north, take short excursions for a taste of Charleston. But from a marketing perspective, the major advertising and promotion investments target those within six hours of the city seeking a cultural, historical, beach or golf oriented vacation.

Figure 1 about here
EXPANSION OF THE DRIVE MARKET

It was decided in the initial meeting that the six-hour prime target radius should be expanded to cities within a ten hour drive radius of Charleston, thus encompassing such major markets as Washington, D.C, Richmond, VA, Nashville, TN and Tampa, FL. With airports shut, and likely to be under heavy security when reopened (therefore becoming a source of traveller aggravation), the crisis team correctly estimated that Americans would for some time be reluctant to fly. Over time, the correctness of this decision became evident as a new post-9/11 travel environment evolved. Many people were now willing to get into their car to drive to places previously considered beyond driving range. Fear of flying alone may have been enough to cause this change in attitude. Adding to this, however, was the additional time required to fly as tightened security measures impacted both front and back ends of a flight. This turned short plane flights into far longer than normal journeys, thus narrowing the travel time between flying and driving from traditionally peripheral markets. Further, Charleston’s strong reputation as a family oriented destination became an added advantage, as selecting a safe vacation destination that could be reached without taking the family through airports or on airplanes became an increased priority for those families still looking to travel.

ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES

The next decision was critical. Rather than the normal reaction of reducing advertising in anticipation of a difficult period, emergency additional advertising expenditures were authorised. Some of these funds came from a re-allocation of resources. For example, it was presumed that international travel would be severely impacted, and expenditures
 earmarked for international travel show participation were re-allocated to the expanded
drive market advertising. Similarly, familiarisation trip plans were scaled back, with
tavel agents from ‘fly markets’ excluded from the programme.

Scheduled advertising copy was immediately pulled and replaced with a new “Fall Back
in Time” campaign that included the tag line “A short drive down the road. A million
miles away” (see Figure 2). These advertisements, which ran within two weeks of
September 11th, sent the clear message that Charleston was not as far as travellers may
perceive, encouraging vacationers to consider a drive vacation to the area.

Figure 2 about here

A holiday advertising campaign was also launched, suggesting that a drive to Charleston
would be a good year-end vacation option (see Figure 3). The intent of the holiday
advertisements was to capture those travellers who might have originally planned to
spend their holidays in such fly-destinations as Florida or the Caribbean; instead
suggesting they consider the comparatively short (not more than ten-hour) drive to
Charleston.

Figure 3 about here

OTHER RESPONSES

To make booking a vacation in the Charleston area more convenient for vacationers from
the expanded drive-in market, travellers not as familiar with the destination as those
within a few hours’ drive, the CACVB worked closely with hotels and attractions to
create pre-packaged vacation opportunities. The CACVB had always championed such a program, with little success. Following 9/11, the tourism community began to respond. The CACVB brought in representatives from the on-line booking company World Res to conduct workshops, following which hotel property and attraction attendees were given the charge of establishing creative travel packages that would both attract visitors and enhance booking ease. The results were a new inventory of pre-packaged offerings and hopefully the creation of a foundation which will support synergistic marketing opportunities within the community.

On another front, it was recognised that many associations would be reluctant to hold their annual meetings and conventions in destinations requiring participant air travel. Seizing the opportunity, ‘Regional Corporate and Association Mini-Blitzes’ were organised in partnership with local hotel properties to visit associations and major companies within the traditional drive radius. These nearby prospects often looked beyond Charleston for their major functions – being close and familiar is not always a strong selling point. The intent of these ‘blitzes’ was to convince organisations that this year holding their events in Charleston’s outstanding facilities, right in their own ‘backyard’, was an ideal opportunity.

Otherwise, those potential vacationers who contacted the CACVB for destination information and those travellers who stopped at a CACVB visitor’s centre were treated with a ‘business as usual’ approach. In a ‘normal’ crisis, deciding how and how soon to declare recovery is difficult. Suggest prematurely that your destination is ready to welcome guests and the result will be disappointed visitors who return home and spread
negative publicity, further slowing recovery. But wait too long and the destination runs the risk of falling out of mind. For the crisis of 9/11, the only local damage was to the psyche, damage shared by all Americans. The CACVB crisis management team’s proactive decision to maintain a positive tone, extolling the many virtues of Charleston while not being afraid to suggest to Americans that it was appropriate to travel and enjoy themselves, it would seem intangibly aided in the city’s post-9/11 recovery.

RESULTS: THE NUMBERS

As did virtually all USA destinations, Charleston area tourism suffered an immediate decline following the events of 9/11. Two effective metrics used to determine the health of the tourism industry are demand, measured by hotel rooms sold, and price, measured by the average daily rate (ADR) for those rooms. Figure 4 and Figure 5 graphically depict these data, in terms of percentage change from the same month of the prior year, for both the Charleston area\textsuperscript{11} and nationally.\textsuperscript{12} In addition to the percentage change, for sake of analysis, Charleston’s raw data are shown in tabular form (Table 1).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure4and5.png}
\caption{Figure 4 and Figure 5 about here}
\end{figure}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Month} & \textbf{Charleston Area} & \textbf{National} \\
\hline
July 2001 & 500 & 550 \\
August 2001 & 450 & 480 \\
September 2001 & 400 & 420 \\
October 2001 & 350 & 380 \\
November 2001 & 300 & 330 \\
December 2001 & 250 & 280 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Table 1 about here}
\end{table}

As can be noted in Figures 4 & 5 and Table 1, as of August, 2001, Charleston was experiencing a far from stellar year. Arrivals were generally flat with no sign of the predicted annual growth the area had enjoyed year-to-year, and had grown to expect. These results, however, were quite comparable to the overall domestic tourism economy, which exhibited a general softness attributed to the broad USA economic slowdown. The
2001 Charleston numbers indicated that through August, on an overall demand basis, that four of first eight months of the year had shown moderate demand declines from the previous year, while the other four months had enjoyed but moderate gains. Similarly, ADR had fallen for three of the eight months leading up to September 11th.

Then came the fateful day of 9/11, and for both Charleston and the entire nation, the tourism industry fell into an abyss. As depicted by Figure 4, overall national September demand fell by 14.8%. Charleston was not spared, as the visitor arrival count slipped even further, having fallen 15.2%. ADR was hit simultaneously, doubling the impact for hoteliers. Nationwide, ADR decline approached 10%. Charleston hotel rates dipped by over 13%. Immediate forecasts foresaw a long and difficult recovery.

While the overall tourism economy continued to suffer following September’s dive, the Charleston area experienced a near immediate trend of recovery. Nationally, October demand was off approximately 10% versus the prior year, an improvement from September’s 15% decline but hardly cause for celebration. For Charleston, October’s decline, just one month removed from 9/11, was but 3%. Through the balance of the year and the first four months of 2002, the USA trended modestly upwards, barely emerging from the red in April. In contrast, Charleston, from November onward enjoyed continuous year-to-year growth, with April’s 317,000 visitors representing the single largest visitor month in the city’s history (Figure 4 and Table 1).

Further, though Charleston’s ADR improved more slowly than demand, this too recovered at a rate which far outpaced the national trend. The improvement, which began by October, and which commenced from a fall more precipitous than the national decline,
had moved into positive territory by January, 2002. Though this flattened by the high season months of March and April, the ADR achieved those months represented hotel prices rivalling the highest ever enjoyed by Charleston hoteliers (Figure 5 and Table 1). Looking back, as the nation and the industry has come to grasp the magnitude of the events of September 11th, such rapid and dramatic recovery, both of visitor arrivals and average daily rates, was well beyond anyone’s expectations.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

One generally thinks of a crisis as a decidedly negative event. However, the *Oxford English Dictionary*\(^\text{13}\) defines crisis as: “a state of affairs in which a decisive change for better or worse is imminent”. Faulkner\(^\text{14}\) noted that crisis management, in line with the theory of chaos, should be viewed as an essentially creative process. This paper reviewed the crisis management of the Charleston Area Convention and Visitors Bureau following September 11th, 2001 and noted how its reactions to the crisis has led to positive outcomes for the area’s stakeholders.

The key strategic responses of the Bureau, in retrospect, seem to have been: 1) their allocation of funds to tourism promotion when the normal reaction would have been to have pulled back; 2) redefinition of their key potential market, emphasising and expanding the drive market; and 3) modification of the advertising message sent that market.

The idea of changing marketing strategy toward the drive market, though made intuitively, fit well with the destination marketing theory of intervening opportunity. As
the theory suggests, when a tourist selects a destination, it is logical to expect that he/she would chose, from among a competitive set of destinations, that destination which best meets his/her needs based upon its distance (or perceived distance) and value (or perceived value) offered. If an otherwise equal but closer and/or cheaper alternative destination exists, the tourist will generally select that destination. What happened post-9/11 is that visitor vacation selection criteria changed, such that perhaps someone interested in a cultural tour, who in the past may well have selected a trip to Europe, this year decided that being overseas added undue risk, thus elevating Charleston’s attractiveness as an intervening opportunity destination (in fact, overall travel from the USA to EC nations fell by 15% in the period following 9/1115). Similarly, for those from the Midwest looking to escape winter’s grasp, in the past the final decision may have been between a family fly-drive vacation to either Florida or the beaches of South Carolina. Faced with such choice, a Florida destination, such as Miami or Orlando, with their considerably warmer winter weather would generally win. This year, with flying not an option, though Florida’s warmth still beckoned, the extra day on the road placed those destinations at a disadvantage, again elevating the Charleston area’s attractiveness.

It must be noted that the concept of targeting new markets in the time of crisis is certainly not novel. For example, it has been documented that the National Tourist Offices of the European Travel Commission refocused their target markets to neighbouring countries, and away from, for example the USA, in the face of the 1991 oil crises which severely increased travel costs.16 A similar response to crisis saw the Singapore Tourism Board during the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s reduce its regional marketing efforts, instead investing in the cultivation of new markets, such as Russia, while placing heavier
than normal focus upon the European and North American markets whose tourists maintained spending power. ¹⁷

So, though not a new approach, the CACVB is to be credited for recognising the challenge and for taking appropriate and rapid action. For, as the numbers show, even as the Charleston area lost those visitors who decided not to travel at all, and lost others who opted not to fly to Charleston, successfully cultivated replacement markets more than compensated for the losses.

As a caveat, it is always difficult for destination marketers to confidently link cause and effect. It is tempting to point to results as a direct function of effort, but with so many factors affecting tourist destination selection, CVBs must be cautious about taking too much credit. The scenario discussed herein was not different. Would travellers have made the decision to visit Charleston without the inducement of the new advertising campaign? Charleston as a destination had much in its favour as people decided to take vacations following 9/11, and many clearly would have driven to the city without reminder. Further, Charleston’s wealth of history synergised well with the heightened patriotism that swept the nation and perhaps many visitors simply decided, again sans CACVB reminder, that Charleston was the place for a patriotic vacation. Unfortunately, no specific advertising conversion study was conducted post-9/11 to help pinpoint cause and effect, and as such we will never know for sure just how effective the CACVB’s actions were. What we do know, however, was that for the Charleston tourism community a terrible situation proved far less destructive than it might have been, and it seems reasonable to conclude that the CACVB’s rapid, creative, and decisive action in
the face of crisis, at least contributed to the relatively positive outcome enjoyed by the community – a silver lining to a very dark cloud.

Today, we understand that no destination is safe from acts of terrorism, whether it be directly as experienced by New York and Washington, or indirectly, as learned by destinations around the globe. A lesson thus learned, by CVBs and in fact all organisations, is the need for a well thought out crisis management plan, broader in scope than we ever in the past envisioned necessary. Further, the 9/11 experience has reiterated the need for flexibility and a degree of nimbleness in the face of unforeseen challenges. Mansfeld\textsuperscript{18}, from an historical study of the Israeli tourism industry, has crafted a series of principles and operative guidelines that he suggested destinations follow when confronted with crisis. His first principle is that crisis management be “treated as a process rather than a one-shot operation”. The flexibility exhibited by the CACVB during the various crisis stages following 9/11 certainly exemplified such a response.

Hopefully, having shared the CACVB’s actions following this fateful experience will serve as encouragement to CVBs faced with a future crisis. More importantly, may this review encourage tourism organisations to revisit their current crisis plan to ensure they are ready to deliver their own rapid response in time of future need.
REFERENCES


(3) Pacific Asia Travel Association, ref. 1 above.


(6) Sönmez, Apostolopoulos, and Tarlow, ref. 5 above.


(12) Smith Travel Research (2002) data disseminated by the company at a seminar sponsored by the Charleston Metro Chamber of Commerce Travel Council, June, Charleston, S.C.


Table 1

Accommodations Occupancy Trends for the Charleston, S.C. Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Roomnights (k)</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADR ($)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Roomnights (k)</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADR ($)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2002</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Roomnights (k)</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>317</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADR ($)</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data represent hotel activity for Charleston and Dorchester Counties, SC.
Source: Center for Business Research, Charleston Metro Chamber of Commerce (2002)
Figure 1

Charleston Area Convention and Visitors Bureau Expanded Drive Market

Source: Charleston Area Convention and Visitors Bureau
Figure 2

Charleston Area Convention and Visitors Bureau Advertisement
“Fall Back in Time”

Source: Charleston Area Convention and Visitors Bureau
Figure 3

Charleston Area Convention and Visitors Bureau Advertisement
“Fall Back in Time”

Source: Charleston Area Convention and Visitors Bureau
Figure 4
Monthly Percentage (Year-to-Year) Change in Travel Demand
USA composite and Charleston, SC

Source of data, USA: Smith Travel Research (2002); Charleston: Charleston Metro Chamber of Commerce (2002).
Figure 5
Monthly Percentage (Year-to-Year) Change in ADR
USA composite and Charleston, SC

Source of data, USA: Smith Travel Research (2002); Charleston: Charleston Metro Chamber of Commerce (2002).

End of Paper